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ABSTRACT 
IMPACT OF THE WORLD BANK’S EASE OF DOING BUSINESS RANKINGS ON 
COMPOSITIONS OF FDI INFLOWS: M&A AND GREENFIELD FDI 
By 
Kim, Anna 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow plays a substantial role in the growth and 
development of every country. Accordingly, the question of what drives FDI inflows has been 
explored and answered in the literature, as has been the positive correlation between FDI 
inflows and regulation indicated by the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Rankings 
(DBR). Relatively little studies has been conducted, however, on the effects of these rankings 
on the two FDI compositions of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and greenfield FDI. This 
paper shows that improved DBR attracts significantly more FDI inflows, though the result 
becomes insignificant, albeit negative (as the DBR is measured in rankings, e.g. 1st is the 
highest rank.), when the sample narrows down to developing economies. Moreover, these 
findings suggest that greenfield FDI is more negatively impacted by regulations than M&A, 
though the effect is not significant. The analysis offered here has potentially important 
implications for governments regarding actions that can improve their DBR and generate the 
benefits associated with increased greenfield FDI, specifically increased capital and rising 
employment rates. 
Keywords: FDI; World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Ranking; M&A; greenfield FDI; 
panel fixed effect estimation
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1. Introduction 
In 2015, global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows increased by 38 percent, 
reaching 1.77 trillion dollars. These figures are the highest since the global economic and 
financial crisis of 2008 to 2009, and recovery in the amount of FDI flows was strong in 2015; 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) were valued at 721 billion dollars. The 
previous year’s funding level was only 432 billion dollars, and the huge increase was the 
principal factor behind the global rebound in 2015. The value of announced greenfield FDI 
remained at its highest value, 766 billion dollars (UNCTAD, 2016). 
Figure 1 illustrates global investment trends from 2003 to 2014 based on the World 
Investment Report (WIR) statistics made available by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Data on FDI inflows and the cross-border M&A is used 
to plot the graph. This paper constructed the greenfield FDI data by deducting the value of 
M&A from the total amount of FDI inflows. It is to be noted that FDI inflow and M&A were 
at their highest levels right before the global financial crisis, in 2009; they then decreased in 
value during the crisis and afterward began a slow recovery. The value of greenfield FDI, 
however, was little affected by the financial crisis, continuing to increase until 2014. This 
trend can be explained by the fact that a high proportion of greenfield FDI goes to developing 
countries. 
Then, in what proportions the aggregate FDI inflows can be divided into M&A and 
greenfield FDI? Figure 2 and 3 show the comparison of proportions of M&A and greenfield 
FDI by grouping countries into either developed and developing. As shown in figure 2 and 3, 
the red colored area from the origin represents the proportion of greenfield FDI out of the 
total FDI inflows (shown as the green colored area from the origin) whereas the blue colored 
area indicates the proportion of M&A. It is notable that the value of greenfield FDI is higher 
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than M&A during the period of 2003 to 2014 in developed and developing countries. 
However, the value of greenfield FDI and M&A is somewhat lower in developing economies 
than developed economies as expected. In addition, the proportion of greenfield FDI over 
M&A is significantly large in developing economies compared to developed, and it may be 
explained by the fact that relatively, there are few large corporations that have the capacity to 
merge  in developing nations. Moreover, one considerable difference between the two 
graphs is that investment trends including FDI inflows, M&A, and greenfield FDI have 
changed according to the financial recession which caused a decrease in the amount of 
investment beginning in 2008. Whereas in developing economies, global financial trends 
have caused a slightly negative change in investment trends and it sustains the increasing 
flows. 
Many studies have been conducted on the relationship between FDI inflows and 
economic growth, and even on the effect of FDI on poverty. Over time, FDI has become 
accepted as a positive aspect of economic development, with the result that political leaders 
and policy makers put a great deal of effort into attracting FDI to their countries. Since then, 
a great many professionals and academics have tried to identify the features and qualities that 
encourage firms to invest as a mode of FDI. We will explore in greater detail factors that 
drive FDI inflows in the literature review section below. UNCTAD’s report defines FDI as an 
investment in one economy made by a resident of another economy with the prospect of 
“lasting interest,” meaning a long-run relationship between the private investor and the 
foreign investment company. This being the case, the FDI data only counts instances in which 
a private investor possess at least 10% of the voting power in the investment enterprise; less 
than 10% ownership counts as a portfolio investment (United Nations, 2009). Much research 
has accordingly been conducted to answer the question of whether FDI inflows are impacted 
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by a country’s regulations in the expectation of higher long-term returns.  
More recently, many researchers have begun to use a new World Bank database 
called the Ease of Doing Business Rankings (DBR) to measure several local regulations 
regarding small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Since the data for this database has been 
collected since 2003, relatively few studies of FDI have had the opportunity to make use of it. 
Among these studies, the empirical results that estimate the impact of the DBR on FDI 
inflows have proved to be quite controversial. Further, little if any work has been done on the 
effects of the DBR on the two compositions of FDI, cross-border M&A and greenfield FDI. 
The purpose of this study is to help fill this gap in the literature by investigating the 
relationship between FDI inflows and the regulatory environments of recipient countries, 
controlling for macro-financial characteristics. This paper thus aims to determine whether 
countries with less burdensome business regulations attract more FDI inflows and how the 
DBR differentially impacts cross-border M&A and greenfield FDI.  
This paper uses a panel data set of 189 developed and developing countries for the 
period from 2004 to 2014 to demonstrate that, on average, the DBR does correlate negatively 
with FDI inflows. Thus, the regression result of greenfield FDI shows a pattern roughly 
equivalent with respect to aggregate FDI to the result with M&A. 
The rationale behind the results can be explained in terms of the tendency of firms to 
make inroads into a foreign market in the mode of greenfield FDI when the regulatory 
environment is more conducive to starting and operating a local firm, as reflected in a high 
DBR (equal to low absolute number of rankings, e.g. 1st is the highest rank.). Greenfield FDI 
requires firms to develop foreign market with a new company, factory, and store, activities 
that incur higher risks than M&A. The social, economic, and political conditions of FDI- 
recipient economies therefore are significant in attracting more greenfield FDI than in M&A. 
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Further, when the sample narrows down to 24 developing economies categorized as low 
income by the World Bank, the positive correlation between increased rankings and FDI 
inflows is not robust. 
This paper is structured as follows. Part 2 reviews the literature on the determinants 
of FDI, FDI and growth, and of DBR and FDI. Section 3 provides the economic specification 
and the data employed in the analysis. Section 4 presents and discusses the results. Section 5 
offers conclusions and insights. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Growth and FDI  
The neoclassical growth model is based on the idea that technological progress and 
population growth are the only exogenous factors that generate economic growth. The effects 
of FDI thus can only translate into economic growth in cases where FDI itself affects 
technology in a positive and permanent way. According to a relatively recent endogenous 
growth model, however, FDI can influence growth endogenously by generating increasing 
rates of returns in production through externalities or spillover effects (Makki & Somwaru, 
2004). 
Many researchers have attempted to prove the causal link between FDI and growth. 
Chowdhury and Mavrotas (2006) have used the Toda-Yamamoto causality test to determine 
whether GDP causes FDI, or vice versa, in three developing countries that are major FDI 
recipients, namely Chile, Malaysia, and Thailand. They report that, Malaysia and Thailand 
show bi-directional causality with respect to GDP and FDI whereas in Chile, GDP causes 
FDI. In another study, Hansen and Rand (2006) analyzed the Granger causal correlation 
between FDI and GDP in a sample of 31 developing countries over a period of 31 years, and 
their empirical results suggest that FDI has a lasting effect on GDP, while GDP has no long-
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term effect on the FDI-to-GDP ratio. It thus appears that FDI causes economic growth 
through transfers of knowledge and new technology. There is debate regarding exactly how 
FDI affects GDP, but it is undeniable that FDI is a significant part of improving economic 
performance. Based on this notion, scholars have begun to conduct studies on investigate the 
causes of FDI inflows that translate into economic development. 
2.2. Determinants of FDI 
Most scholars acknowledge the importance of FDI, and those who study the topic 
tend to focus their research on the motivations for FDI inflows. In other words, the aim is to 
identify the features of FDI-recipient economies that are more successful in drawing FDI 
inflows. This paper surveys the relevant literature and explains why certain factors have been 
used as control variables.  
As mentioned above, one of most influential determinants of FDI is the domestic 
market size of FDI-recipient countries. Most studies include GDP and such variants as GDP 
growth and GDP per capita as variables in their regression models, and the results have been 
remarkably consistent in showing a positive and significantly robust correlation between 
GDP and FDI. Artige and Nicolini (2005) suggest that GDP per capita acting as proxy for the 
market size is the most significant FDI decision element supported by the horizontal model. 
Chakrabarti (2001) asserts that FDI begins to rise and expand further once the market size 
reaches a certain critical point. In this paper, GDP per capita is used as one of the control 
variables to capture the effect of the home country’s domestic market size. This variable, 
however, determined through dividing by the population, only measures the influence of the 
purchasing power of domestic households in the market. The present study therefore also 
includes the total populations to control fully the impact of the domestic market size. 
Trade openness is instrumented as the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of 
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GDP. This method is standard in the FDI literature, but the analysis outcomes are somewhat 
controversial. Chakrabarti (2001) discovers that this variable correlates relatively strongly 
with FDI inflow. Ang (2007) also asserts that trade openness impacts positively to FDI 
inflows: “Specifically, a one percentage point increase in trade openness would generate 
about a 1.094–1.323 percentage point increase in FDI inflows according to our model.” Some 
research, however, is inconsistent with these arguments. Kolatad and Villanger (2008), for 
example, demonstrate that FDI in the service sector is impervious to the trade openness of the 
FDI recipient countries. In an effort to resolve the issue, this paper also examines the strength 
of the relationship between trade openness and FDI inflows and how trade openness affects 
FDI inflows either negatively or positively. 
The inflation rate, which indicates the overall change in prices in an economy and 
thus represents a country’s macroeconomic stability, is calculated as the annual growth rate of 
the GDP implicit deflator. Demirhan and Masca (2008) assert that FDI inflow correlates 
significantly and negatively with inflation, arguing specifically that having low inflation 
tends to attract more FDI inflows to developing economies. Consistent with this view is the 
work of Kok and Ersoy (2009), whose investigation of the effect of FDI inflows on 
macroeconomic performance proves that inflation has a negative impact. Ezeoha and 
Cattaneo (2012), however, find empirically that higher inflation rates do attract more FDI 
inflows. This contradiction is another that the present study seeks to resolve.  
More recently, some researchers have added to the equation institutional variables 
representing the political stability of FDI-recipient countries. Thus Globerman and Shapiro 
(2002) state that “Our results suggest that weakening environmental protection regimes are 
more likely to discourage than encourage FDI.” Chan and Gemayel (2004) assert that 
stability in terms of investment risk is a crucial feature for attracting FDI, particularly in the 
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Middle East and North Africa, since firms naturally desire the most accurate estimates 
possible of their rates of return. The study by Demirhan and Masca (2008) just mentioned, 
however, shows that political risk simply has not been an influential factor, or at least a 
statistically significant one, in attracting FDI. In other words, when a host country promise 
high returns to firms, they may fail to take into account the political risk there. In this study, 
the impact of political stability on FDI inflows is examined using the database of Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI), which was sourced from the World Bank. 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) tend to invest in a country where there are 
sufficient numbers of skilled labors to absorb the process of technical knowledge transfer. 
Wage levels are an important driving force, but skilled employment is also essential for the 
transfer of knowledge and management techniques. Noorbakhsh, Paloni, and Youssef (2001) 
use different proxies for labor skill to demonstrate its effect, employing an econometric 
approach. Their method is first to run several regression models with secondary school 
enrollment as a variable, and then to replace this variable with such stock measures of human 
capital as the cumulative years of secondary and tertiary education in the working age 
population. Presented as significant and positive coefficients, these results elucidate an 
important point of human capital in FDI inflows. Blomstrom and Kokko (2003) similarly 
argue that the level of human capital in FDI recipient economy determines both the amount 
of FDI inflows and the capability of local firms to reap potential spillover benefits. In keeping 
with these findings, this paper uses the percentage gross rate of secondary school enrollment 
data to control for the effect of this variable on FDI inflows.    
2.3. Regulation (DBR), FDI and Growth  
The Doing Business ranking (DBR) is a quantitative indicator of the business 
regulations of the world’s approximately 189 countries that is based on a survey conducted by 
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entrepreneurs who are active in each. The available data is from 2004 to 2015. The Doing 
Business index is comprised of 11 areas of regulations related to daily business life, 10 of 
which are utilized in computing the ease of doing business rankings, namely starting a 
business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting 
credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, 
and resolving insolvency (www.doingbusiness.org). 
The World Bank Group (2014) issues a Doing Business report every two years, at 
which time it introduces important improvements to its indicators that have resulted from 
economic analysis of integrated regions as well as specific countries. A new conceptual 
framework can be constructed by tracking these improvements, and the efficiency of 
regulation can be enhanced as well. Even though Doing Business indicators are based on 
domestic small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), many policy makers acknowledge 
their explanatory power regarding increased FDI inflows. Cross-country correlations have 
already proved that economies with higher DBR do attract more FDI inflows irrespective of 
other contributing determinants, such as the domestic market size. This empirical result 
suggests that countries that provide better business environments for domestic SMEs tend to 
offer the same positive environments for foreign companies too. Figure 2 shows graphically 
the relationship between the positive performance of DBR and increased FDI inflows per 
capita, and demonstrates that countries that are adjacent to the frontier had higher FDI 
inflows per capita in 2011. 
Though the DBR was developed only fairly recently, several studies have already 
been conducted using the DBR dataset. A few scholars have chosen the DBR as a proxy for 
business regulatory environment and have conducted studies on the effects of regulation on 
economic performance in general. Djankov, McLiesh, and Ramalho (2006) demonstrate that 
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countries with better regulations experience more fast-paced growth. The effect of improved 
regulations is substantial. In their OLS regressions, which include dummies for each quartile 
of the business regulation index, moving to the best quartile from the worst generates a 2.3 
percent rise in average yearly growth. Messaoud and Teheni (2014) have also examined the 
relationship between business regulations and economic performance using the Doing 
Business index, in this case in 162 countries over the period from 2007 through 2011. Their 
regression results make clear that most regulation indices among the ten sub-indicators of the 
DB correlate positively with the average growth rate, with the exception of the “Trading 
Across Borders” and “Dealing with Construction Permits” indices.  
In addition to exploring the effects of regulations on general economic growth, some 
researchers have attempted to find a parallel path to growth. This work has focused on FDI 
that correlates with the growth and regulatory setting of economies. Jayasuriya (2011) 
demonstrates that DBRs can significantly increase FDI inflows, in this case by approximately 
300 million USD; the phenomenon may be attributable to the DBR having “a strong 
signaling-effect” on foreign investors. Busse and Groizard (2008) stress that regulation can 
have a beneficial effect on FDI, leading to economic development in FDI recipient countries. 
Thus, governments need to tackle the institutional environment and regulatory framework to 
enjoy the potential positive effects of FDI inflows.  
Piwonski (2010) demonstrates that there is a strong correlation between DB 
indicators and FDI inflows, a finding that confirms the direct linkage of inflows to 
government action. Some governments have already tried to increase their DBRs by 
eliminating unnecessary red tape in order to increase investment in domestic firms. Corcoran 
and Gillanders (2015), using a pure cross-sectional approach, also find that a better business 
regulatory environment induces more FDI inflows on the average. More specifically, they 
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also report that most of this positive influence comes from “Trading Across Borders,” 
whereas other sub-indicators of the DBR have little or no impact on FDI inflows. Namely, 
open trade countries tend to draw more inward FDI, and its profits therefore go to their 
domestic markets. 
Morris and Aziz (2011) have conducted regional studies focused on countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa and Asia. They report that overall DBR and FDI inflows do not correlate 
strongly in any database of emerging Asian countries from 2000 to 2005. Two factors of the 
DBR, however, “Registering Property” and “Trading across Borders,” did correlate positively 
with FDI inflows in Asian and Sub-Saharan Africa countries over the six-year period from 
2000-2005. This finding can be illustrated by the fact that MNEs tend to invest in the vast 
market economies, such as India and China. In the same way, in Africa, Nigeria, Sudan, and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo are the largest recipients of FDI despite having low 
rankings. 
The Doing Business Rankings can be a useful tool, not only for the objective 
measurement of regulations, but also for measuring numeric variation over time. By 
examining improvements in the rankings for each economy during a certain period, 
researchers can use the delta value as a proxy for regulatory reform. Thus Eifert (2009) 
investigates the effect of regulatory reform on investment rates and economic growth using a 
five-year panel data of the DBR through Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimators. He finds 
that regulatory reforms influence economic performance positively, especially in such 
relatively well-managed poor countries as China and India. However, according to the paper 
by Jayasuriya (2011), there is weak evidence or correlation to imply that the large 
improvement in rankings gauged by “Reform” (a dummy variable for economies with a rise 
of greater than nine ranks in the rankings) attracts more FDI inflows. 
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Despite the fact that DB reports’ prescriptive power has generated considerable 
controversy, many governments use DB studies to guide their reform efforts. A paper by 
Hanusch (2012) accordingly aims to provide some suggestions for the proper way to use DB 
studies to leverage the potential of various countries. First, he suggests that governments 
should seek to create reforms of their investment climates that are “feasible,” meaning that 
the benefits should outweigh the financial and political costs. Second, if “visibility” (in terms 
of the overall impact of the DBR) is the goal, governments should undertake reforms that can 
be expected to realize the greatest advances in the overall DBR; if, in contrast, the goal is 
“impact” (in terms of the actual economic effects of DB-related reforms), governments need 
to target two specific DB sub-indicators, “Getting Credit” and “Enforcing Contracts.” 
2.4. Greenfield FDI, M&A and Regulation  
Greenfield FDI establishes new entities setting up new offices, buildings, and 
factories, in the course of which capital is used for the purchase of fixed assets, materials, and 
goods and services, in turn increasing local employment. By contrast, cross-border M&A 
includes merging or taking over the capital, assets, and liabilities of currently existing 
enterprises in foreign countries.  
Only a few studies have distinguished aggregate FDI into the two different 
compositions of greenfield FDI and M&A, each with its own separate effects and features. 
One example is a paper by Wang and Wong (2009) that finds, based on a sample of 84 
countries, that the growth effect of greenfield FDI is significantly robust and positive, in 
contrast, that of acquisition FDI is negative. M&A can also be beneficial, but only when host 
countries have adequate human capital. Nanda (2009) uses a different method to examine the 
impact of the two separate modes of FDI on economic development, but reaches substantially 
the same conclusions: greenfield investment shows a significant positive influence on 
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economic performance, and M&A do not. Calderón, Loayza, and Serven (2004), however, 
argue the opposite, that the acquisition of existing assets (M&A) has a stronger impact on 
growth than investment in new assets (greenfield FDI).  
The World Investment Report (WIR) 2000 gives voice to some of the concerns 
regarding foreign acquisitions, remarking that “FDI entry through the takeover of domestic 
firms is less beneficial, if not positively harmful, for economic development than entry by 
setting up new facilities.” Not only do cross-border M&A fail to develop productive capacity, 
but they also merely transfer ownership from domestic to foreign companies. This relocation 
of ownership is often followed by employment adjustment of domestic company and 
elimination of some production or functional activities, such as research and development 
(CNUCED, 2000). Nanda (2009) also points out the benefits and concerns regarding both 
modes of FDI: “Greenfield investment not only creates additional capacity on its own, it also 
stimulates further investment through forward and backward linkages” (compared to 
acquisition FDI using pre-existing linkages). For their part, transnational corporations prefer 
to develop their overseas markets through the M&A mode than through greenfield FDI 
because less risk is involved in using the resources of exiting firms. Moreover, M&A do not 
create gestation lag; they can earn profits from the first day of business.  
It is now clear that greenfield FDI brings greater benefits to developing countries 
than M&A or privatization. Paradoxically, however, most developing countries implement 
economic policies that encourage FDI through M&A rather than greenfield FDI. The paradox 
is explained by the fact that greenfield FDI requires extensive legal and administrative 
clearance from local government agencies before a firm even opens its doors (Nanda, 2009). 
Reducing red tape through such measures as decreasing the steps, and therefore the length of 
time, necessary to start a business could therefore create conditions more favorable to 
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greenfield FDI. This is not to say that local governments should abolish all regulations 
regarding foreign corporations that are pursuing greenfield FDI in order to enter the domestic 
market. The point is that the government agencies that administrate these regulatory 
measurements need to accelerate their processes. In fact, one of the reasons that China enjoys 
a higher rate of growth than India is the greater rapidity with which it approves FDI projects 
(Nanda, 2004). 
From the perspective of the government of an FDI-recipient country, greenfield FDI 
is preferable because it generates more benefits by opening up the domestic market, in 
particular increases in capital and the employment rate. For MNEs, they prefer to employ 
greenfield FDI to enter foreign markets where there are business-friendly environments 
without any unnecessary administrative regulations. For them, the World Bank’s DBR serves 
as one of the signals that a country is reducing red tape with regard to its own domestic firms. 
Thus, by appreciating the fact that business regulations impact greenfield FDI relatively more 
than M&A, an FDI-recipient country can use the DBR as an indicator of willingness to carry 
out administrative reform in order to encourage much greener greenfield FDI. 
3. Research Model 
3.1. Hypotheses 
This paper aims to estimate the explanatory power of the World Bank’s DBR, which 
currently includes 189 countries for the period from 2004 to 2014. Using the DBR as a 
quantitative proxy for the efficiency of local governments with respect to business regulations, 
the amount of FDI inflow into each country will be compared with the DBR of the same year. 
The two modes of FDI, greenfield FDI and M&A, will also be compared with the rankings. 
The following three hypotheses will be tested.  
The first null hypothesis is that each economy’s DBR will have a positive and 
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significant correlation with an increase in FDI inflows. The alternative hypothesis is that 
moving up in the rankings will attract FDI inflows. It should be observed that a lower DBR 
number (equal to high rank, e.g. 1st is the highest rank.) indicates that the business regulatory 
environment is relatively more conducive to starting and operating a firm, which results a 
negative correlation between the FDI inflows and the DBR. Going deeper, this paper will 
divide the aggregate FDI inflows into M&A and greenfield FDI. Thus, the second null 
hypothesis is that the DBR is a significant determinant of M&A, whereas the alternative 
hypothesis is that M&A is not significantly impacted by the rankings. The last null hypothesis 
is that the DBR is neither a negative nor a significant determinant of greenfield FDI; the 
alternative hypothesis is that greenfield FDI is negatively and significantly influenced by the 
DBR. In what follows, the data will first be examined for correlation, and then a panel fixed 
effects model will be performed in order to provide statistical results. Conclusions will be 
drawn from the fit of the line, and the variability of the data will be addressed in an effort to 
make clear the limitations of the paper.  
3.2. Data and Methodology 
Before discussing the methodology of the paper, it will be useful first to review the 
data used in the econometric model. Table 1 shows the list of dependent and independent 
variables. FDI inflows, M&A, and greenfield FDI are the dependent variables. Data on FDI 
inflows have been extracted from UNCTAD’s WIR for various years. Data on M&A have 
also been taken from the UNCTAD database accessible through its website; data on 
greenfield FDI, however, is not available. Thus, following the method used by Nanda (2009), 
data on greenfield FDI have been calculated by subtracting the value of M&A from the total 
FDI inflows. 
A key independent variable is the World Bank’s DBR, which measures several 
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important dimensions of the business regulatory environment in which local firms operate. 
The focus of this paper is on how countries’ overall Doing Business rankings change over 
time; however, economies are ranked based on scores in ten different categories, each of 
which consists of equally weighted sub-indicators. The following 11 areas of business 
regulation are measured: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting 
electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, 
trading across borders, enforcing contracts, resolving insolvency, and labor market regulation. 
The rankings of economies regarding the labor market regulation indicators are not, however, 
incorporated in the aggregate DBR.  
Table 2 shows how the DBR is measured in the various areas. The Doing Business 
index is based on domestic laws and regulations as well as administrative requirements. The 
DBR is composed through a number of rounds of interviews with professionals in both the 
private and public sectors and through questionnaires, conference calls, written 
correspondence, and visits by a regional team. The Doing Business team first develops 
questionnaires for each topic and gathers the completed forms of survey questions from 
private sector practitioners and government officials. The team then evaluates the related laws 
and regulations along with the information from the surveys. After the data have been 
reviewed and the report written up, the final report is published (Doing Business, 2016).  
Doing Business data covers the full scope of factors, policies, and institutions that 
impact the quality of a country’s business regulation or economic potential, including market 
size, macroeconomic stability, and level of corruption, each topic being relevant to a diverse 
features of the business regulatory environment. These data thus shed the light on the 
importance of government actions in the day-to-day running of local SMEs. The motivation 
for making the data accessible is to encourage governments to design regulatory 
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environments in which new entrants with compelling ideas are able to start businesses and 
established firms can invest and expand (Doing Business, 2016). This paper will use the 
Doing Business data as a proxy for a government’s regulatory actions and will compare this 
data with the dependent variables of aggregate FDI inflows, M&A and greenfield FDI.  
In order to monitor the robustness of the results, several additional determinants of 
FDI inflows have been added in the model. The control variables are selected based on an 
extensive review of the previous literature regarding the potential determinants of FDI 
explained above. GDP per capita and trade openness are used as macroeconomic variables, 
and inflation rate is included as a financial stability variable. The population variable controls 
fully the impact of domestic market size, and the governance indicator is meant to measure 
the quality of government in terms of respecting its citizens and formulating sound policies. 
The labor skill variable represents the availability of skilled workers in the foreign market 
measured as the percentage of secondary school enrollment. All control variables are sourced 
from the World Bank.  
Table 3 illustrates the fundamental features of the data and shows simple summaries 
of the sample and the measures, including the number of observations, mean, standard 
deviation, maximum, and minimum. The number of observations varies with the amount of 
data for each variable. A strongly balanced panel dataset is, however, used in the model, 
meaning that each cross-sectional unit is observed for the same time periods. The amounts of 
money were logged to correct the measurement and follow normality, and percentage point 
data was divided by 100 in order to match measurement with other variables. 
With the purpose of testing the three null hypotheses mentioned above, the equation 
is constructed in the following form:  
𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝑍𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖 
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- 𝑌𝑖𝑖  𝑖𝑖 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑒 (𝐼𝐼):𝐹𝐹𝐼 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑔𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑖 𝐹𝐹𝐼,𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑀&𝐴,
𝑖ℎ𝑒𝑣𝑒 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑐 𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑡 = 𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑣.  
- 𝑋𝑖𝑖  𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑒 𝑘𝑒𝑐 (𝐼𝐼), 𝑖𝑖 𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑒,𝐹𝐷𝐷. 
- 𝛽1 𝑖𝑖 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑖𝑣 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑘𝑒𝑐 𝐼𝐼:𝐹𝐷𝐷. 
- 𝑍𝑖𝑖  𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑖 𝑎𝑣𝑣 𝑖𝑖 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑖𝑣 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑖:𝐺𝐹𝐺 𝑖𝑒𝑣 𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑎,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖,
𝑡𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑒,𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑣𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑣 𝑖𝑘𝑖𝑣𝑣.  
- 𝜃 𝑖𝑖 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑖𝑣 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑖𝑣 𝐼𝐼𝑖 
- 𝑎𝑖𝑖(𝑖 = 1 …𝑖) 𝑖𝑖 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑢𝑖𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑣𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑖𝑣 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑐 (𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑎𝑣 −
𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑐𝑡) 
- 𝑢𝑖𝑖  𝑖𝑖 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑣 𝑡𝑒𝑣𝑡 
Much of the literature on the FDI determinants has used the fixed effects panel data 
estimation. Using this estimation allows controlling for such unobservable and unmeasurable 
variables as national factors (e.g.,, policies, legal systems, and international agreements), 
which are captured by 𝑎𝑖𝑖, the unobserved individual heterogeneity in the model. The main 
benefit of choosing the panel fixed effects model is to solve common bias resulting from 
omitted variables. For instance, even if one omitted variable, such as the legal system, is 
correlated with both the dependent variable and one or more included independent variables, 
the fixed effects method controls for unobserved heterogeneity, in this case, a legal system 
that is constant with time. However, in order for this to be true, the omitted variables must 
have time-invariant values with time-invariant effects. Lastly, robust standard errors are used 
to eliminate possible bias from multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity in all models. There 
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are some limitations regarding the data and the model, which will be explained in next 
section. 
3.3. Limitations 
The Doing Business methodology is designed to replicate certain aspects of business 
regulations, and it has its merits and limitations that need to be stated when using its data set. 
Two positive aspects of this methodology are that the data is cost-effective and that it can be 
comparable across economies (Doing Business, 2016). On the other hand, the data is 
subnational, meaning that it is based on a survey conducted in the country’s largest business 
city, for instance Shanghai in China, for which reason it may not representative of regulations 
across the country (Data Notes, 2012).  
Second, the data was originally gathered under four sub-indicators in 145 economies 
starting from 2003, and six more sub-indicators and forty-four additional countries have since 
been included. Thus, countries with the same scores on subheadings may have different 
aggregate rankings owing to the added number of economies. Further, the data only focus on 
countries’ relative improvements in each year, and do not in every case reflect absolute 
changes or reforms. In other words, all 189 countries could improve at the same time over a 
decade, but the rankings always range from 1 to 189 in which their relative rankings would 
still remain the same.  
Third, the data assumes that a business has an access to all information on every 
requirement and does not squander any time finishing necessary procedures. In the real world, 
businesses can miss relevant information and can choose not to follow burdensome 
procedures. When this happens, it may take longer to start a firm, and as a result the data can 
differ from what the local entrepreneurs report in the World Bank’s survey. Lastly, the data is 
only gathered from an exclusive type of business, typically a limited liability company, and 
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therefore does not reflect the voices of sole proprietors (Data Notes, 2012). These limitations 
to constructing the DBR objectively may give rise to measurement errors. 
There is also a methodological limitation that needs to be addressed. Although the 
fixed effect estimation is free from bias caused by the time-constant country effect, it may 
suffer from an endogeneity problem, specifically reverse causality. For instance, the amount 
of FDI inflows can change the regulatory environment of a country that receives FDI. From 
the government’s perspective, this increase can motivate deregulatory policies and 
administrative business processes to encourage further FDI inflows, creating a positive 
feedback loop. It would be, however, tricky to assess the sole impact of regulation on FDI 
inflows. Also, country-specific, time-variant factors can be correlated with independent 
variables, and this kind of omitted variable bias cannot be solved using the panel fixed effect 
estimation. For example, an omitted variable such as the tax rate on corporate income can be 
correlated with FDI inflows, M&A, and greenfield FDI, thereby leading to bias. 
4. Results  
Table 4 presents four models undertaken in different ways. For the first and second 
models, the independent variable is logged FDI; the first model does not include any control 
variables, whereas the second is run with all of the control variables. The first model does not 
show any significant correlation between FDI inflows and the DBR. However, when all the 
control variables, including logged GDP per capita, logged population, trade openness 
divided by 100, inflation rate divided by 100, governance, and labor skill divided by 100, are 
embodied in the second model, the DBR is a robustly significant determinant of FDI inflows 
at the 5% significance level, and the coefficient shows that moving up one rank in the DBR 
leads to a 0.457 percentage rise in the amount of FDI inflows. Again, it must be kept in mind 
that a drop in the rankings (equal to the increase in the absolute number of the ranking) 
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corresponds to more burdensome regulations on domestic firms, which should mean a 
negative relationship between rankings and FDI inflows; namely, a country that is ranked 
higher on the DBR can expect greater FDI. 
In Models 3 and 4, the dependent variables are logged M&A and greenfield FDI. In 
neither model is the DBR significantly related with M&A and greenfield investment. 
However, greenfield FDI is negatively impacted by the DBR, which means that an 
improvement of one ranking (i.e., a decrease in the absolute number of the ranking) results in 
a 0.358 percentage rise in greenfield investment inflows. By contrast, the value of M&A has a 
positive relationship with the DBR. Namely, the value of greenfield FDI can be increased by 
a foreign government’s moves to build a more business-friendly market, whereas the value of 
M&A cannot be increased by such measures.  
When the results are compared, those of Models 2 and 4 have the same pattern and 
structure, with the beta coefficient and its sign of DBR indicating negatively and percentages 
of 0.457 and 0.358, respectively, whereas the coefficient of M&A is positive and a percentage 
of 0.0656. Moreover, the beta coefficients for the control variables are also to a certain degree 
equivalent. Specifically, among the control variables, logged GDP per capita shows positive 
and robustly significant relationships with both FDI inflows and greenfield FDI at the 1% 
significance level, while it has a negative correlation with M&A. In addition, FDI inflows 
and greenfield FDI are significantly and positively impacted by logged population, whereas 
M&A is not. Likewise, signs and beta values are quite similar for Models 2 and 4, for 
instance positive signs for the trade openness variable as opposed to the negative sign in 
Model 3. It is therefore suggestive that the DBR is more likely to be significantly correlated 
with the value of greenfield FDI than M&A in cases where more accurately collected data 
was available. 
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The results of the control variables are consistent with previous studies. Thus 
strongest determinant of FDI is logged GDP per capita, where a p-value is less than the 1% 
significance level. Most studies present empirical results that have a significant and positive 
association between FDI inflows and the market size of recipient countries. Further, logged 
population and trade openness are also positively and significantly associated with FDI 
inflows, as expected.  
Table 5 indicates the regression results when narrowing down to developing 
economies in isolation. From the aggregate data including all 189 economies, this paper only 
extracts countries categorized as low income by the World Bank, and it constructs a new 
panel dataset for conducting the panel fixed effects estimation. When looking at Model 2 
supplemented with the control variables, it is noteworthy that a favorable relationship exists 
between improvements in the rankings and FDI inflows, though the correlation is not robust. 
The coefficients are also smaller than is the case when all economies are included in the 
analysis (i.e., the results from Table 4, Model 2). None of the control variables, apart from 
logged GDP per capita, is significantly correlated with FDI inflows. 
There are a number of ways to explain the lack of a significant relationship between 
the rankings and FDI inflows for developing nations. The work of Jayasuriya (2011) suggests 
one possibility, namely that the DBR may reflect only the formal time and costs once a firm 
is in complete compliance with the regulations in a foreign country, though this scenario may 
not be indicative of actual business experiences. In addition, Hallward-Driemeier and 
Pritchett (2011) point out a discrepancy between policy and its implementation, observing 
that “policy implementation often deviates from the stated policy, in firm (or individual) 
specific ways,” such as bribes, gifts, and unexpected clandestine meetings with the 
government officials. This does not of course mean that the government of a developing 
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country should focus on ensuring full compliance with its regulation and forego trying to 
improve its standing on the DBR. Also, it should again be noted that the results of this paper 
are based on the averaged values of 24 developing economies and therefore cannot be 
generalized to developed countries.  
5. Conclusion 
Using panel data from approximately 189 developed and developing economies for 
the period from 2004 to 2014, this paper is the first to show empirically that, for the average 
economy, improvement in the Doing Business Rankings increases FDI inflows. In keeping 
with the results of previous literature, improvements in other determinants of FDI are indeed 
found to correlate with greater inflows of FDI. It may be the case, however, that a higher DB 
ranking has a strong signaling effect on foreign investors, encouraging an inflow of foreign 
capital. 
Second, this paper demonstrates that an improvement in the DBR is more likely to 
encourage multinational enterprises to enter foreign markets through the mode of greenfield 
FDI rather than M&A.  Thus, foreign corporations tend to invest in countries in which 
government agencies streamline the regulatory process. Recipient governments prefer 
greenfield FDI over M&A owing to its ability to create additional capacity through increasing 
capital and the employment rate. The deregulation of administrative procedures favored by 
entrepreneurs can therefore be a win-win strategy for both foreign firms and domestic 
governments, which in return can reap the benefits of inflowing greenfield FDI. 
This paper does have some limitations in terms of data and statistical analysis, 
specifically measurement errors and an endogeneity problem caused by the omitted variable 
bias and reverse causality. Within these limitations, the aim is to suggest various perspectives 
on the effects of regulation on FDI, especially on the two FDI compositions of M&A and 
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greenfield FDI. Governments can thus use the findings presented here to encourage foreign 
investment by improving their Doing Business rankings according to the type of FDI that 
they wish to encourage to their domestic markets. 
Given the heterogeneity of the 189 sampled economies, it would be useful to 
determine how the Doing Business rankings impact FDI inflows into countries across 
geographical regions. Further research might therefore investigate whether foreign investors 
are more likely to invest in emerging Asian economies given similar improvements in their 
DBR rankings as opposed to investment in Europe or the Americas. A similarly fruitful line 
of analysis could focus on how improvements in DBR rankings relate to FDI inflows in the 
various industrial sectors, primary, manufacturing, and service. As more data become 
available, researchers and policy makers should be able to answer such questions, and 
thereby provide policy makers and firms with insights regarding the significance of the DBR. 
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6. Appendix 
Figure 1. Global FDI inflows, M&A, and greenfield FDI, 2003-2014 
(in millions of dollars) 
Source: UNCTADstat database 
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Figure 4. Better overall regulation correlates with greater FDI inflows per capita 
 
Figure 4.Better overall regulation correlates with greater FDI inflows per capita. Reprinted 
from “Doing Business 2013,” by the World Bank, 2013, Doing Business Report, 48. 
Copyright (2013) by the World Bank. 
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Table 1. Description of variables 
Source: Author
Variables Description Sources 
FDI US $s at current prices and current exchange rates in millions UNCTAD STAT 
M&As 
Sales of companies in the host 
economy to foreign TNCs (-) Sales of 
foreign affiliates in the host economy 
UNCTAD cross-border 
M&A database 
Greenfield FDI Calculated by the difference between FDI inflows and M&A inflows Author 
Doing Business 
Rankings 
Ranked from 1 to 189 (1= most 
business-friendly regulations) 
World Bank’s Doing 
Business 
GDP per capita 
Gross domestic product divided by 
midyear population in current  
U.S. dollars 
World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 
Population Total number 
Trade openness The sum of exports and imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
Inflation rate The annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator (annual %) 
Governance indicator 
A simple average of the component 
indicators ranging from approximately 
-2.5 to 2.5 
World Bank's 
Governance Indicator 
Labor Skill School enrollment, secondary  (% gross) 
World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 
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Table 2. What Doing Business measures 
What Doing Business measures – 11 areas of business regulation 
Indicator set What is measured 
Starting a business Procedures, time, cost and paid-in minimum capital to start a limited liability company 
Dealing with 
construction permits 
Procedures, time and cost to complete all formalities to build a 
warehouse and the quality control and safety mechanisms in the 
construction permitting system 
Getting electricity 
Procedures, time and cost to get connected to the electrical grid, 
the reliability of the electricity supply and the cost of electricity 
consumption 
Registering property Procedures, time and cost to transfer a property and the quality of the land administration system 
Getting credit Movable collateral laws and credit information systems 
Protecting minority 
investors 
Minority shareholders’ rights in related-party transactions and in 
corporate governance 
Paying taxes Payments, time and total tax rate for a firm to comply with all tax regulations 
Trading across borders Time and cost to export the product of comparative advantage and import auto parts 
Enforcing contracts Time and cost to resolve a commercial dispute and the quality of judicial processes 
Resolving insolvency 
Time, cost, outcome and recovery rate for a commercial 
insolvency and the strength of the legal framework for 
insolvency 
Labor market 
regulation Flexibility in employment regulation and aspects of job quality 
Note. Reprinted from “About Doing Business 2016,” by the World Bank, 2016, Doing 
Business Report, 20. Copyright (2016) by the World Bank. 
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Table 3. Statistical description of data 
Source: Author
Variable Obs Mean Std Max Min 
Log(FDI) 1900 6.747075 2.407545 -3.454788 12.63254 
Log(M&As) 1079 5.573255 3.062956 -4.60517 12.30982 
Log(Greenfield) 1604 6.999946 2.00831 .0813053 12.06227 
DBR 1916 88.24791 50.51728 1 175 
Log(GDP/cap) 2033 8.382264 1.541387 4.782983 11.66706 
Log(Pop) 2068 15.60237 2.048113 9.89369 21.03389 
Open/100 1931 9.630031 5.575706 .01 19.28 
Inflation/100 2022 .0645245 .0840656 -.2954719 1.038228 
Governance 2073 -.0490044 .8878416 -1.928332 1.985394 
Labor skill/100 1360 .7904315 .2784491 .0916514 1.655813 
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Table 4. Impact of DBR on FDI inflows/M&A/greenfield FDI  
(Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)  
 Log(FDI) Log(M&A) Log(Greenfield) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Doing Business Ranking -0.00360 -0.00457* 0.000656 -0.00358 
 (0.00231) (0.00246) (0.00672) (0.00258) 
Log(GDP/cap)  0.626*** -1.186** 0.879*** 
  (0.229) (0.575) (0.247) 
Log(Population, total)  3.067* 3.223 3.092** 
  (1.635) (3.521) (1.554) 
Trade Openness/100  0.740** -0.282 0.447 
  (0.354) (0.872) (0.399) 
Inflation/100  0.450 0.801 0.189 
  (0.458) (1.199) (0.391) 
Governance  0.672* 1.180 0.233 
  (0.370) (1.307) (0.428) 
Labor Skill/100  -0.694 -0.160 -0.888 
  (0.651) (1.456) (0.778) 
Constant 7.184*** -46.92* -36.59 -49.99** 
 (0.204) (24.710) (55.540) (23.990) 
     
Observations 1,455 890 571 772 
R-squared 0.003 0.095 0.014 0.102 
Number of Countries 169 147 119 130 
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Table 5. Influence of DBR on FDI inflows/M&A/greenfield FDI to developing countries  
(Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 Log(FDI) Log(M&A) Log(Greenfield) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Doing Business Ranking -0.0101** -0.00136 -0.0177 0.00477 
 (0.00423) (0.00550) (0.0194) (0.00276) 
Log(GDP/cap)  1.613** -5.986 1.483** 
  (0.766) (3.724) (0.623) 
Log(Population, total)  4.544 4.627 1.546 
  (3.287) (18.11) (2.350) 
Trade Openness/100  -0.232 -0.143 -0.159 
  (0.141) (0.944) (0.215) 
Inflation/100  1.333 -4.733 -0.598 
  (1.331) (13.51) (1.091) 
Governance  -0.389 -3.746 0.0881 
  (0.812) (2.858) (0.739) 
Labor Skill/100  -0.869 4.532 5.931 
  (6.524) (28.22) (3.931) 
Constant 6.474*** -80.17 -40.49 -31.66 
 (0.609) (51.86) (306.3) (40.46) 
     
Observations 249 127 36 104 
R-squared 0.021 0.344 0.259 0.494 
Number of Countries 28 24 13 18 
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Table 6. Selected countries 
Selected Countries 
Afghanistan Ecuador Libya Senegal 
Albania Egypt, Arab Rep. Lithuania Serbia 
Algeria El Salvador Luxembourg Seychelles 
Angola Equatorial Guinea Macedonia, FYR Sierra Leone 
Antigua and Barbuda Eritrea Madagascar Singapore 
Argentina Estonia Malawi Slovak Republic 
Armenia Ethiopia Malaysia Slovenia 
Australia Fiji Maldives Solomon Islands 
Austria Finland Mali South Africa 
Azerbaijan France Malta South Sudan 
Bahamas, The Gabon Marshall Islands Spain 
Bahrain Gambia, The Mauritania Sri Lanka 
Bangladesh Georgia Mauritius St. Kitts and Nevis 
Barbados Germany Mexico St. Lucia 
Belarus Ghana Micronesia, Fed. Sts. St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Belgium Greece Moldova Sudan 
Belize Grenada Mongolia Suriname 
Benin Guatemala Montenegro Swaziland 
Bhutan Guinea Morocco Sweden 
Bolivia Guinea-Bissau Mozambique Switzerland 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Guyana Myanmar 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Botswana Haiti Namibia Taiwan, China 
Brazil Honduras Nepal Tajikistan 
Brunei Darussalam Hong Kong SAR, China Netherlands Tanzania 
Bulgaria Hungary New Zealand Thailand 
Burkina Faso Iceland Nicaragua Timor-Leste 
Burundi India Niger Togo 
Cabo Verde Indonesia Nigeria Tonga 
Cambodia Iran, Islamic Rep. Norway Trinidad and Tobago 
Cameroon Iraq Oman Tunisia 
Canada Ireland Pakistan Turkey 
Central African 
Republic Israel Palau Uganda 
Chad Italy Panama Ukraine 
Chile Jamaica Papua New Guinea United Arab Emirates 
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China Japan Paraguay United Kingdom 
Colombia Jordan Peru United States 
Comoros Kazakhstan Philippines Uruguay 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Kenya Poland Uzbekistan 
Congo, Rep. Kiribati Portugal Vanuatu 
Costa Rica Korea, Rep. Puerto Rico (U.S.) Venezuela, RB 
Côte d'Ivoire Kosovo Qatar Vietnam 
Croatia Kuwait Romania West Bank and Gaza 
Cyprus Kyrgyz Republic Russian Federation Yemen, Rep. 
Czech Republic Lao PDR Rwanda Zambia 
Denmark Latvia Samoa Zimbabwe 
Djibouti Lebanon San Marino   
Dominica Lesotho São Tomé and Príncipe   
Dominican Republic Liberia Saudi Arabia   
Source: Author 
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